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I. INTRODUCTION
Investors filed a class action suit against an accounting firm'
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York2 alleging false representations in violation of Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 and Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5.4 The accounting firm moved
that the case be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which
relief could be granted.5 The court granted the motion but also
granted plaintiffs leave to replead.6 The investors declined to re-
plead and instead filed an appeal to the Second Circuit, asserting
that the claim adequately stated a cause of action for violation of
federal securities law.7 The Second Circuit concluded that in cir-
cumstances where persons have purchased stock in a company
that issued a press release containing false and misleading finan-
cial information, with a notation that the information is unaudited
and without mention of its outside auditor, they cannot recover
from the auditor for false or misleading statements contained in
the press release attributed to the auditor.8
Among the duties of the Securities and Exchange Commission
is to keep the public stock markets free from fraud and abuse.9
1. The accounting firm was acting as an independent auditor for a corpora-
tion which had recently sold stock in an initial public offering.
2. See Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, No. 97 Civ. 2189(SAS), 1997 WL
563782 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1998).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
5. See Wright, 1997 WL 563782, at *1.
6. See id. at *4.
7. The action under appeal is Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169
(2d Cir. 1998).
8. See Wright, 152 F.3d at 178.
9. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680
(N.D. Ind. 1966).
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One of the most powerful tools in doing so is Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. That Section and Rule 10b-5,
promulgated by the Securities Exchange Commission, prohibit the
use of any scheme to defraud or the making of any untrue state-
ments of a material fact or omission thereof in connection with the
sale of securities.10
For many years the enforcement of this regulation was divided
into two components: primary and secondary liability.'1 Primary
liability existed where one acts directly contrary to the statute.12
Secondary liability resulted from aiding and abetting a direct vio-
lation, which generally consisted of acting (or omitting to act) when
under the duty to correct an error of which one knew. 13
When the question of whether aiding and abetting was enough
to meet the standard of primary liability was finally presented to
the United States Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank. of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,14 it ruled that an aiding
and abetting cause of action is not supported by the text of the
statutes in question. 15 The Supreme Court also explained that
while there was no longer a concept of secondary liability, many of
the situations formerly thought of as secondary actually met the
threshold test for primary liability.16
While the concern used to be to determine if a cause of action
met the elements of primary or secondary liability, the result of
this decision is that the concern has now shifted to exactly where
the cutoff exists as to meeting the elements of primary liability.
Different tests have arisen among the United States' Circuit
Courts to determine whether an activity meets the threshold of
primary liability.
This casenote will examine the recent case of Wright v. Ernst
& Young.17 In doing so, it will examine the two main tests being
employed, which have become known as the bright line test and
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993). The rele-
vant part of these sections are quoted later in this paper.
11. See Wright, 152 F.3d at 170-75 (discussing the history and development of
the theories of liability growing from the wording of the statutes).
12. See id. at 179-81.
13. See id.
14. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
15. See id. at 191.
16. See id.
17. 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998).
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the substantial participation test. Finally, this casenote will sug-
gest reasons why one test is the preferable test, with the recom-
mendation that it be the standard test in determining primary
liability in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
§ 10(B) AND RULE 1OB-5
After the stock market crash of 1929, and the resulting depres-
sion, it became evident that regulation and control of speculation
in the securities markets would be essential to try to prevent fu-
ture recurrences.' 8 Congress enacted two pieces of legislation to
address this issue.19 The first became known as the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1933, and dealt mainly with the initial distributions
of securities. 20 The second was the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and was aimed mainly at the regulation of post-distribution
trading, most notably being the publicly traded stock markets, but
also at trading of non-registered stock.2 '
Together, the Acts create an extensive scheme of civil liabil-
ity.22 They "embrace a fundamental purpose . . . to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor."23
Violators are not only subject to proceedings brought by the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, but also proceedings brought by
private plaintiffs who sue under the express private rights of ac-
tion contained in the Acts.24 Of the many actions, the most com-
mon private action takes place under the general antifraud
provision of the 1934 Act, which is Section 10(b).25 The Securities
and Exchange Commission adopted Rule 10b-5 several years later,
which mirrors the doctrine of the 1934 Act. 26
The general theme of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is to pro-
hibit the use of any manipulation or deception in the sale of securi-
ties. The fundamental purpose of the 1934 Act is to implement a
18. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 170.
19. See id. at 170-71.
20. See id. at 171.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972).
24. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 171.
25. See id.
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
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"philosophy of full disclosure." 27 Specifically, Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange.. .(b) To use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national se-
curities exchange or any security not so registered, any ma-
nipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors. 28
Similar in nature and in wording, Securities and Exchange Rule
10b-5 makes unlawful any provision "that would cause reasonable
investors to rely thereon, and, in connection therewith, so relying,
cause them to purchase or sell a corporation's securities." 29 The
Rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any per-
son, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.30
The fact that both statutes contain the phrase "directly or indi-
rectly" seems to be the root of the doctrine of secondary liability, or
at least has led some to suggest it.31 The thought behind secon-
dary liability, or aider and abettor liability as it was more com-
monly called, was that it required a minimum of committing one of
the "manipulative or deceptive" acts under Section 10(b) and Rule
27. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
29. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968).
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
31. See Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175-76 (2d Cir. 1998)
(discussing and rejecting the notion of the wording "indirectly" in relation to secon-
dary liability).
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10b-5, with the same degree of scienter that primary liability re-
quires.3 2 It was understood that liability under Rule 10b-5 could
be imposed not only on persons who made fraudulent misrepresen-
tations, but also on those who had knowledge of the fraud and as-
sisted in its perpetration. 33 This liability has extended to lawyers
and accountants. 34
III. FACTS OF WRIGHT V. ERNST & YOUNG
Wright v. Ernst & Young was filed after BT Office Products
Corporation (BT) sold a public offering of common stock.35 Its ac-
counting firm was alleged to have known that potentially mislead-
ing statements were being communicated to investors. 36 The
plaintiffs viewed this as action that would constitute primary lia-
bility.37 The accounting firm did not issue the financial statement,
but rather it came from BT's management, making this an exam-
ple of indirect liability.3 8 This is a case that would almost certainly
have been brought on secondary liability grounds in the pre-Cen-
tral Bank days. In fact, the defendant's defense was that their ac-
tion amounted to no more than aiding and abetting, which was
specifically not enough to impose liability under Central Bank.39
A. Factual and Procedural History
As BT expanded its business, but prior to their initial public
offering, it acquired a company called Summit Office Supply (Sum-
mit).40 BT had hired the accounting firm of Ernst & Young as
outside auditor of the company's financial records.41 Ernst &
Young issued audit opinions as to the accuracy of BT's financial
32. See Robin v. Arthur Young, 915 F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1990).
33. See IIT Intl Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 927 (2d Cir. 1980).
34. See IT Int'l, 619 F.2d 909 (holding that accountants have a "duty to take
reasonable steps to correct misstatements they have discovered in previous finan-
cial statements on which they know the public is relying"); SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d
486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that a lawyer "has no privilege to assist in circulat-
ing a statement with regard to securities which he knows to be false simply be-
cause his client has furnished it to him").
35. See Wright, 152 F.3d at 171.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 171-72.
38. See id. at 172.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 171.
41. See Wright, 152 F.3d at 171.
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statements for the years of 1993 and 1994.42 Later, in July, 1995,
it reissued the 1994 audit opinion for use in BT's initial public of-
fering prospectus, which included a statement of BT's first quarter
1995 results.43 The audit included a full scope audit of most of
BT's business, but only a limited review of the recently acquired
Summit business. 4
Later in the year, Ernst & Young began a full scope audit of
the Summit business.45 While working on this effort, it discovered
an under-accrual of Summit's accounts payable, which would have
a negative effect on the financial statements, and alerted BT man-
agement of the findings.46 Upon further consideration, it decided
the problem was not material 47 and signed off on the 1995 finan-
cial statements, knowing that they would be used by investors in
evaluating the BT stock offering. 48
Based on oral assurances from Ernst & Young, BT issued a
press release in early 1996, announcing the 1995 financial results
and speaking of strong growth during the year.49 The press re-
lease did note that the figures were unaudited, however, and made
no mention of Ernst & Young.50
A few months later, it became clear to both BT and Ernst &
Young that the under-accrual problem was more serious than pre-
viously thought.5 ' After analyzing the information, BT announced
that it was restating its 1995 results from a $1.5 million profit to a
42. See id.
43. See id. at 171-72.
44. See id. at 172. A limited review is a less intense version of audit which
would assume more corporate records as correct without the independent verifica-
tion done under a full scope audit. Generally when an audit opinion is issued it is
assumed that a full scope audit has been conducted, following the Generally Ac-
cepted Auditing Principles.
45. See id.
46. See id. An under-accrual of accounts payable would indicate that more
money was owed to creditors than was reflected on the financial reports. An ad-
justing entry would cause an amount equal to that shortfall to reduce the net earn-
ings, which in this case eliminated profits completely and caused a loss to be
shown on the income statement.
47. Though the auditors recognized that a problem existed, by deciding that it
was not material they were in essence saying that any impact from such a problem
would have little if any impact on the overall financial picture of the company.
48. See Wright, 152 F.3d at 172.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
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$200,000 loss. 52 With that announcement, BT's stock dropped
25%, injuring Wright and other stockholders who joined the class
action.53
This class action was filed in the district court, claiming the
accounting firm "recklessly failed to detect various acts of financial
malfeasance committed by employees of BT Office Products."54
The district court held that "the Complaint fails to allege the es-
sential elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim."55
B. Treatment of the Case by the Second Circuit
The Second Circuit must have felt pulled by the strong leash of
Central Bank.56 They noted the Tenth Circuit's requirement that
the defendant must directly communicate misrepresentations to
investors for primary liability to attach.57 However, the lack of
any reference to Ernst & Young in the violating communications
made the stretch just too tenuous for the court to accept. 58 The
lack of any mention of Ernst & Young made the Second Circuit feel
that the accountants neither directly nor indirectly communicated
misrepresentations to investors.5 9 Because of that premise, the
court could not find that Ernst & Young made a material misstate-
ment on which an investor would rely.60
The court concluded that holding Ernst & Young primarily lia-
ble in this situation would be effectively reviving aiding and abet-
ting liability under a different name.61 It went on to affirm the
decision of the district court in dismissing the claim for failure to
state a claim on which relief could be granted. 62
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, No. 97 Civ. 2189(SAS), 1997 WL 563782, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1998).
55. Id.
56. See Wright, 152 F.3d 169 at 173, (stating "[w]e conclude that Wright's ar-
guments are foreclosed by Central Bank").
57. See Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1226-27 (10th Cir.
1996).
58. See Wright, 152 F.3d at 175.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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IV. AIDING AND ABETrING
Since the Securities and Exchange Acts have been promul-
gated, it became settled law that aider and abettor liability existed
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.6 3 This did not remove all am-
biguity and confusion from the section, however. This confusion
resulted from the language of the section, which stated that it was
a violation to mislead either directly or indirectly, which seemed to
indicate that it could, yet decisions were being handed down that
hinted that they could not.64
The concept of aiding and abetting has come into the securities
arena from its origin in tort law.6 5 At the time just after the Secur-
ities and Exchange Acts became law the Restatement of Torts
viewed liability for aiding and abetting where there is:
harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of
another, a person is liable if he
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of
duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to
the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing
a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered,
constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.66
Central Bank noted that "[tihe first and leading case to impose
[private aiding and abetting actions] was Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Ins. Co."6 7 In fact, the provisions of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 were applied to aiders and abettors even before the first
case recognizing civil liability under that statute and rule.68 The
first case to deal with the applicability of Section 10(b) and Rule
63. See Robin v. Arthur Young, 915 F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating
"[olur recognition of aider and abettor liability is rooted in 20 + years' [sic]
precedent").
64. See generally Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (discuss-
ing Congress' intention with regard to the scope of Rule 10(b)); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (defining scope of Rule 10(b) with close attention
to statutory text).
65. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164, 181 (1994) (discussing how aiding and abetting has its origin in criminal law
doctrine, and has worked its way into torts as a concert of action principle).
66. Restatement (First) of Torts § 876 (1939).
67. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 169.
68. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 676
(N.D. Ind. 1966).
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10b-5 to aiders and abettors was SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 69 which
involved a suit by the SEC for an injunction against alleged princi-
pal violators and certain aiders and abettors. The complaint
against the aiders and abettors was upheld on a motion to dis-
miss. 70 The district court cited the criminal provisions making
aiders and abettors responsible as principals and stated, "[n]o good
reason appears why this same rule should not apply in an injunc-
tive proceeding to restrain a violation of the same statute."71
Behind the growth of this doctrine was the idea that since
knowing assistance of or participation in a fraudulent scheme
under Section 10(b) gives rise to liability equal to that of the per-
petrators themselves, the facts alleged by the (plaintiff) trustees, if
proven, would permit recovery under Section 10(b). 72
This has led to a search of the legislative history to find the
intent of Congress. At that time, the securities industry wanted to
limit the liability of aiders and abettors, and the SEC would have
been satisfied with a provision limited to a confirmation of its own
powers.73 The SEC developed a proposed amendment which was
modified in the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency as
suggested by the New York Stock Exchange.74 The bill, favorably
reported out of committee but never passed by Congress, would
have amended Section 21(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
as follows:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission *** that any
person is aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing,
or procuring, or is about to aid, abet, counsel, command, in-
duce, or procure such a violation, it may in its discretion
bring an action * * * to enjoin such acts or practices and to
enforce compliance with this title. * * * The Commission may
transmit such evidence as may be available concerning such
acts or practices to the Attorney General, who may, in his dis-
cretion, institute the necessary criminal proceedings under
this title.75
69. 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
70. See id.
71. Id. at 43.
72, See Pettit v. American Stock Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21, 28 (S.D.N.Y.
1963).
73. See Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 679.
74. See id.
75. Id. (quoting S. 3770, 86th Cong. § 20 (1960)).
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This amendment was not enacted by Congress. 78 The courts
have wisely and consistently refused to draw such speculative in-
ferences from Congressional non-action. 77 When considering a leg-
islative history strikingly similar to that urged upon this court by
the defendant in Brennan, the Supreme Court stated "[wle draw,
therefore, no inference in favor of either construction of the Act-
from the Department's request for legislative clarification, from
the congressional committee's willingness to consider it, or from
Congress' failure to enact it."78
The Brennan court then went back to the philosophy and goals
of the Securities and Exchange Acts to determine the case at
hand.79 It is hardly a question that investors can be harmed when
an issuer of stock fails to disclose information of its own improper
activities affecting the value of its stock.80 When a brokerage firm
dealing heavily in the issuer's stock does roughly the same thing,
the results are not that different.81 The heart of the matter is that
the loss to the investor may be the same. This made the court real-
ize that while it is not to say that there is no distinction between
the two types of situations, they are quite closely related. 2 The
court therefore emphasized that a statute with a broad and reme-
dial purpose such as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 should
not easily be rendered too weak to deal with new and unique situa-
tions within the scope of the evils intended to be eliminated.8 3 In
the absence of a clear legislative expression to the contrary, the
statute must be flexibly applied so as to implement its policies and
purposes.8 4 The above described reasoning led the court to hold
that it was improper to say that civil liability for damages, estab-
lished under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, may never,
under any circumstances, be imposed upon persons who do no
more than aid and abet a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5.
8 5
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 47-48 (1950).
79. See Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 680.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 680-81.
85. See Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 681.
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Aside from the legislative history, the defendant in Brennan
points out that there is nothing in the statute indicating a Con-
gressional intent to impose civil liability on persons aiding and
abetting violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.86 But, like-
wise, "one can search the statute in vain for language indicating
that a violator of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 should be liable in a
civil action for damages. Such liability was developed by the courts
on general principles of tort law."8 7 In the years following Bren-
nan, other courts have taken the same position. 8
V. IMPACT OF CENTRAL BANK OF DENVER v. FIRST INTERSTATE
BANK OF DENVER
On at least two occasions, the United States Supreme Court
reserved a decision on whether those who aid or abet were subject
to civil liability.8 9 Finally, in 1994, a case reached the United
States Supreme Court in which the court attempted to clear up the
confusion regarding secondary liability.90 In the late 1980's, a mu-
nicipal building authority issued $26 million in bonds to finance
public improvements at a planned residential and commercial de-
velopment. 91 Central Bank of Denver served as the trustee for the
bond issues.9 2 These bonds were secured by landowner assess-
ment liens, and had covenants that required that the land subject
to the liens be worth at least 160% of the bonds' outstanding prin-
86. See id.
87. Id. at 681.
88. See generally Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1983) (hold-
ing that same standards should be applied in determining aider and abettor liabil-
ity under § 17(a) of the Securities Act, assuming that there is a private right of
action thereunder); Kerbs v. Fall River Indust., Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974)
(holding that knowing assistance and participation in a fraudulent scheme in con-
travention of 10(b) of the statute and Rule 10b-5 were sufficient for liability).
89. See generally Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (holding
that private cause of action will not lie under Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 in the absence of an allegation of intent to
deceive, manipulate or defraud); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375
(1983) (holding that the availability of an express remedy under the 1933 Securi-
ties Act against one who includes falsehood or misleading information in registra-
tion statement does not preclude defrauded purchaser of stock from maintaining
an action).
90. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164, 167 (1994).
91. See id. at 167.
92. See id.
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cipal and interest.93 The covenants required the developer to give
Central Bank an annual report containing evidence that the 160%
test was met.94
In early 1988, the developer provided Central Bank with an
updated appraisal of the land, showing land values almost un-
changed from an appraisal done nearly two years earlier. 95
Shortly after, Central Bank received a letter from the underwriter
of one set of the bonds, expressing concern that property values in
the area were declining, and that this report, which was being used
for another round of bond issues, was based on an appraisal that
was sixteen months old.96 Central Bank asked its in-house ap-
praiser to review the developer's appraisal, and their conclusion
was that the values appeared optimistic. 97 They recommended
that an independent, outside firm be asked to provide an opinion.98
Central Bank then decided to hold off on that until late in the year
(which would be six months after the second round of bond financ-
ing).99 Before the review was ever completed, the building author-
ity had defaulted on the new set of bonds.10°
Some of the purchasers, including First Interstate Bank of
Denver and Jack Naber, who had purchased $2.1 million of the
bonds, sued Central Bank and others, alleging a violation of Sec-
tion 10(b).' 10 The District Court for the District of Colorado
granted summary judgment to Central Bank, but the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit reversed.102 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the confusion over the existence and
scope of the Section 10(b) aiding and abetting action. 10 3
Ultimately, the Court held the statutory language of the Act
did not reach those who aid and abet a section 10(b) violation. 10 4
However, they went on to say that the absence of aiding and abet-
ting liability does not mean that secondary actors in the securities
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 167.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 168.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 168.
103. See id. at 170.
104. See id. at 177.
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markets are always free from liability under the securities Acts. 105
Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant or bank, who
employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement
(or omission) may be liable as a primary violator under Rule 10b-5,
assuming all the requirements for primary liability under that rule
are met. 10
Central Bank thus elevated the distinction between primary
and secondary liability to critical importance by its elimination of
secondary liability under Section 10(b).10 7 More precisely, the
Court in Central Bank held "contrary to the established law in
every federal circuit, that Congress had never imposed such
liability."'08
VI. ANALYSis
A. The Second Circuit's Bright Line Test
Despite the attempt to add clarity through the Central Bank
decision, in actuality what happened was that the area of unknown
shifted from the area of secondary liability to the boundaries of pri-
mary liability. 1' 9 Thus, the difficulty after Central Bank lies in
determining the circumstances under which a party can be said to
have indirectly engaged in the conduct referenced by Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5.11 0 "Unfortunately, deciding when conduct consti-
tuting aiding and abetting rises to the level of prohibited primary
conduct is not well settled.""' The circuit courts have started us-
ing different standards to come up with a definition as to the
threshold required for a secondary actor's conduct to implicate pri-
mary liability in the cases they have heard since Central Bank. 112
105. See id. at 191.
106. See id.
107. See In re MTC Elec. Technologies S'holders Litig. 898 F. Supp. 974, 985
(E.D.N.Y. 1995).
108. Id.
109. See generally MTC Elec., 898 F. Supp. at 974, 987 (stating "[i]n short, Cen-
tral Bank has generated a fair amount of confusion in the lower courts both in
identifying the line between primary and secondary liability").
110. See Lawton v. Nyman, No. Civ.A. 98-288-T, 1999 WL 669837, at *3 (D.R.I.
Aug. 24, 1999).
111. Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 1996).
112. As will be discussed, the circuit courts have broken into two main tests,
the bright line test and the substantial participation test, as well as some hybrids
of the two.
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The plaintiffs in Wright were attempting to show primary lia-
bility in three ways.113 First, they wanted to bar the use of the
"bespeaks caution doctrine," where a disclaimer serves a warning
on the contents of a report. 1 4 Second, they wanted a more broad
interpretation of what the market would implicitly understand by
a company's release of financial results and an accountant's role in
that release. 115 Third, they wanted a more narrow view in giving
effect to the word 'unaudited' when such a disclaimer cannot ne-
gate the auditor's own conduct in causing the dissemination of
false financial results.116 Even further, they wanted to bar the au-
ditor from being able to hide behind the word 'unaudited."' 7
The bright line test"" stands for the philosophy that to be pri-
marily responsible, there must be a showing that the person knew
or should have known that the representation would be communi-
cated to investors." 9 While there are examples of decisions within
the Second Circuit finding liability against this general view, they
are definitely the exception, and not the rule.120 In the case of In
re MTC Electronic Technologies, '2' it was noted:
[f Central Bank is to have any real meaning, a defendant
must actually make a false or misleading statement in order
to be held liable under Section 10(b). Anything short of such
conduct is merely aiding and abetting, and no matter how
substantial that aid may be, it is not enough to trigger liabil-
ity under Section 10(b).' 22
The Second Circuit also noted that words such as "assisting,"
"participating in," and "complicity in," as well as similar synonyms,
all fall within the bar of Central Bank.123
113. See Wright, 152 F.3d at 176-78.
114. See id. at 176.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. The name bright line test is somewhat of any oxymoron, as there is no
easy bright line, like other 'bright line' tests in different areas of law.
119. See Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1226.
120. See SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding
the president of a brokerage firm primarily liable for orchestrating the manipula-
tive acts of multiple branch offices in the sale of securities at excessive prices).
121. 898 F. Supp. 974 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
122. Id. at 987.
123. See Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997).
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The scope of the view behind the bright line test is well cap-
tured in the following:
[Iun a situation in which the accountant 'gives an opinion or
certifies statements' about a company-statements which the
accountant later discovers may not have been accurate ...
then the accountant has a duty to disclose the fraud to the
public .... Conversely, if an accountant does not issue a pub-
lic opinion about a company, although it may have conducted
internal audits or reviews for portions of the company, the
accountant cannot subsequently be held responsible for the
company's public statements issued later merely because the
accountant may know those statements are likely untrue.124
The apparent reason for this reasoning is this court's view of
the holding in Chiarella v. United States. 125 In that case the Su-
preme Court held that the duty to disclose arises when one party
has information that the other party is entitled to know because of
a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence be-
tween the parties. 126
In speaking of the bright line test, it is important to note that
in Wright, not only did the Second Circuit find that Ernst & Young
was not primarily liable, it agreed with the district court's
holding.127
B. The Ninth Circuit's Substantial Participation Test
Whereas the bright line test stands for the finding that pri-
mary liability only exists where the party was directly involved in
making the communication, the substantial participation test
takes a more flexible view. Here, third party defendants can be
primarily liable for statements made by others where the defen-
124. Id. at 721 (quoting In re Cascade Intl Sec. Litig., 894 F. Supp 437, 443
(S.D. Fla. 1995)). But cf ZZZZ Best Securities Litig, 864 F. Supp. 960 (C.D. Cal.
1994); In Re Software Toolworks, 38 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1994).
125. 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
126. See id. at 228.
127. Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 1998). The dis-
trict court's holding was that "[h]olding E[rnst & Y[oungl primarily liable under
Rule 10b-5 in spite of its clearly tangential role in the alleged fraud would effec-
tively revive aiding and abetting liability under a different name, and would there-
fore run afoul of the Supreme Court's holding in Central Bank." Wright v. Ernst &
Young LLP, No. 97 Civ. 2189(SAS), 1997 WL 563782, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10,
1998).
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dant substantially participated in preparing the statement.128
This would seem to allow accountants to be found liable more
easily.
Shortly after the Central Bank decision, the case of In re ZZZZ
Best Securities Litig. 129 put the question of primary and secondary
liability before the District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia. A short history of the ZZZZ Best Company legacy is not only
entertaining and almost unbelievable, but worth explaining as
background to the litigation. It may even provide insight into why
the court developed the substantial participation test. ZZZZ Best
Company was a carpet-cleaning and building restoration company
founded by Barry Minkow when he was just 16 years old.130 Just
five years later the company was publicly traded, reporting sales of
over $50 million and a market capitalization of $200 million.131
Shortly thereafter it was discovered that the whole company was
actually nothing more than a giant Ponzi scheme, 132 which ulti-
mately cost investors and lenders more than $100 million. 133
In 1986, just before the company was to go public, the Ernst &
Young 34 partner in charge of this account began an audit.135 He
noticed that the company had a $7 million contract to restore a
damaged building in Sacramento.136 Questioning the validity of
the contract, the auditor demanded to see the building.137 As the
contract was fictitious, the company needed to remedy the problem
and sent representatives to Sacramento to scope out a building to
128. See In re Software Toolworks, 38 F.3d 1078, 1078 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994):
Despite Central Bank, we nevertheless consider this issue because the
plaintiffs' complaint clearly alleges that [defendant] is primarily liable
under section 10(b) for the SEC letters... This evidence is sufficient to
sustain a primary cause of action under section 10(b) and, as a result,
Central Bank does not absolve [defendant] on these issues.
Id.
129. 864 F. Supp. 960 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
130. See Daniel Akst, How Barrry Minkow Fooled the Auditors, Forbes, Oct. 2,
1989, at 126, available at LEXIS, News Library, Forbes File.
131. See id.
132. The Ponzi scheme is named after the swindler Charles A. Ponzi. This type
of scheme is an investment swindle in which earlier investors are paid off with
money put in by later investors in order to encourage more and bigger risks.
133. See Akst, supra note 130.
134. The firm that did the audit was Ernst & Whinney, but Ernst & Young is
the successor firm following a merger.
135. See Akst, supra note 130.
136. See id.
137. See id.
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suit its purposes.138 Upon arriving in Sacramento, the company
representatives found only one building in the city large enough to
have sustained $7 million worth of damage: the Capital Mall build-
ing.139 They then went to the building owners and expressed in-
terest in leasing a large amount of space, and stated that their
investor could only come on a weekend." 4° In reality, they didn't
want the auditors to bump into anyone who might torpedo their
plan. 41 They then set up a phony property management company
to tour them around, as dealing with the real one would be too
dangerous to the hoax. 142 The day of the tour, they drove to the
building and posted ZZZZ Best signs wherever they could, left a
ZZZZ Best T-shirt in an empty room, and stole a set of blue prints
to carry around for effect.' 43 The plan was a great success, with
the Ernst & Young partner saying that "[tihe tour was beneficial in
gaining insight as to the scope of the damage that had occurred
and the type of work that the Company can do."" 44 In other words,
ultimately, the plan worked.
The public offering took place, and the company received not
only the proceeds, but also a loan from a bank.145 The auditor,
perhaps suspicious of some of the happenings of the company, de-
manded to see another building.146 He was told that they had an
$8.2 million contract in National City, a suburb of San Diego.14 7
When his executives went there to reenact the Sacramento ploy,
they discovered that there weren't any buildings in National City
that could even remotely pass for a structure in the midst of an
$8.2 million facelift. 148 Undaunted, they rented a warehouse in
National City, filled it with $168,000 of the cheapest carpet they
could find, and concocted a story that the supplies were in National
City, but the job was actually in San Diego.149 Company repre-
sentatives then located a building (which happened to be a brand
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See Akst, supra note 130.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See Akst, supra note 130.
148. See id.
149. See id.
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new office building, just taken over by the Federal Savings & Loan
Insurance Corp.), obtained the keys with the same weekend story,
put up ZZZZ Best signs and phony contractor permits, and took
down any "For Rent" signs. 150 After another successful scam, the
careful auditor later demanded to see the same building with the
work completed.151 This forced the company to take a seven-year
lease on the entire building so they could give the follow-up
tour.15 2 Later, the same day of the follow-up tour, they flew the
auditor to Dallas to view a warehouse full of carpet (the same car-
pet he had seen in National City/San Diego on his earlier trip).'5 3
All of this planning paid off, as the auditor's note to the file indi-
cated that the "Ijiob looks very good." 154
Ultimately, after the sham fell apart, injured investors filed
suit against Ernst & Young. They alleged that the first quarter
financial information from 1986, which was included in ZZZZ
Best's offering prospectus, gave the company a clean audit.' 55 De-
spite the company's efforts to dupe the auditors as described above,
plaintiffs alleged that Ernst & Young did know of major discrepan-
cies in internal accounting procedures and that the figures re-
leased by ZZZZ Best were not accurate.' 56 Thus, the plaintiffs
alleged that by issuing this report, Ernst & Young knowingly en-
gaged in a fraudulent scheme which contained misrepresentations
and/or omissions that directly affected the purchase of the com-
pany's initial stock offering.' 57
The defendants in the case countered that because of the Su-
preme Court's elimination of aider and abettor liability, the plain-
tiffs could not base their case on Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and
they therefore sought summary judgment.158 They contended that
all of the financial reports, press releases and prospectus docu-
ments were released to the public by ZZZZ Best and would there-
fore not be attributable to Ernst & Young.' 59
150, See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See Akst, supra note 130.
154. Id.
155. See In re ZZZZ Best Securities Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 964 (C.D. Cal.
1994).
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 965.
159. See id. at 966.
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The court immediately noted that under Central Bank, there
is "a significant change in Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liability."160
They then summarized ZZZZ Best by stating that the "real issue
presented by this motion is whether Central Bank's prohibition of
aider and abettor liability also limits the scope of primary liability
under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5." 16 1 It is still generally understood
that a party may violate Section 10(b) even though that party did
not directly commit the manipulative or deceptive act in ques-
tion.' 62 To aid in the decision, the court looked to the three ele-
ments that the Ninth Circuit stated in Levine v. Diamanthuset,
Inc.163 These elements are: 1) conduct as outlined in the statutes;
2) a purchase or sale of securities connected to this conduct; and 3)
resulting damages. 64
The plaintiffs countered defendant's claims that additional
statements (beyond the report in the prospectus) could not be at-
tributed to Ernst & Young because no evidence had been offered to
show that these statements indicated preparation or review by the
auditors claiming there was sufficient evidence to show Ernst &
Young's participation.' 6 5 The court, noting that the case was a
close call and perhaps one of first impression, relied on two earlier
circuit court holdings and agreed with plaintiffs. 166
160. Id. at 967.
161. In re ZZZZ Best, 864 F. Supp. at 968.
162. See Lawton v. Nyman, No. Civ.A. 98-288-T, 1999 WL 669837, at *3 (D.R.I.
Aug. 24, 1999).
163. 950 F.2d 1478, 1485 (9th Cir. 1991). This was a case in which investors in
a diamond investment scheme brought a class action against a diamond invest-
ment corporation and its officers, banks, trust company, counsel for corporation,
and firms with which counsel was affiliated, alleging violations of securities laws,
RICO, and various state laws. The district court held that confirmations of depos-
its sent by bank and trust company to investors did not constitute "securities," that
allegations of fraud were not stated with sufficient particularity to state a claim for
primary liability under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5, as well as holding on two issues
outside the scope of this paper on RICO and California Corporations Code.
164. See id.
165. See In re ZZZZ Best, 864 F. Supp. at 970.
166. See generally SEC v. Seaboard, 677 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that
"[ain accountant may be liable for direct violation of [Rule 10(b)] if its participation
in the misrepresentation is direct and if it knows or is reckless in not knowing that
the facts reported in the prospectus materially misrepresent the condition of the
issuer"). See also Union Carbide Corp. Cons. Prod. Bus. Sec. Lit., 676 F. Supp. 458
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that an accountant's "[preparation of misleading projec-
tions or provision of the raw data for such projections can constitute participation
in a misrepresentation, and lead to primary 10b-5 liability").
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On the issue of omissions of information, it is well settled that
failure to act does not give rise to a Section 10(b) claim unless the
plaintiffs establish that defendants have a specific relationship
which creates such a duty.167 The significance of the Dirks holding
is that if Ernst & Young is found at trial to have sufficiently partic-
ipated in the preparation of the additional misstatements or omis-
sions such that they are attributed to themselves, then they will
likewise be found to have a duty to disclose or correct these previ-
ously released misrepresentations.168
In summarizing their logic as to what has now become known
as the substantial participation test, the ZZZZ Best court made a
statement which most courts seem to miss:
While the investing public may not be able to reasonably at-
tribute the additional misstatements and omissions to E & Y,
the securities market still relied on those public statements
and anyone intricately involved in their creation and the re-
sulting deception should be liable under Section 10(b)/Rule
10b-5.169
The court reaffirmed the Ninth Circuit's finding in Blackie v.
Barrack 70 that "'Rule 10b-5 liability is not restricted solely to iso-
lated misrepresentations or omissions; it may also be predicated on
a practice, or course of business which operates... as a fraud.'"' 71
C. Other Circuits' Views
Though the Ninth Circuit's substantial participation and the
Second Circuit's bright line tests have come forward as the leading
tests, other circuits and the district courts within their jurisdic-
tions have not been totally silent on the issue. The Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois seems to lean toward the substantial participation
test in Cashman v. Coopers & Lybrand.172 In that case, they note
that an accountant can be held primarily liable under Rule 10b-5
for material misstatements or omissions in connection with the
sale of a security. 73 They also state that in their circuit, primary
liability under Section 10(b) requires an accountant's misstate-
167. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983).
168. See In re ZZZZ Best, 864 F. Supp. at 971.
169. Id. at 970 (emphasis added).
170. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975).
171. In re ZZZZ Best, 864 F. Supp. at 972 (citation omitted).
172. 877 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. 11l. 1995).
173. See id. at 432.
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meat to be certified, audited, prepared or reported. 174 In dictum,
they note that under Section 10(b), a misstatement is as actionable
as an omission.175 They further note that defendants, Coopers and
Lybrand, may be held primarily liable for any misstatements in
the prospectus which can be attributed to statements made in the
financial statements or other certified reports issued to the part-
nership at issue.176
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania also leans toward sub-
stantial participation, but perhaps not as far along the continuum
as the Eastern District of Illinois.177 In the case of Vosgerichian v.
Commodore Int'l, 178 a decision rendered just months after Central
Bank, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Court dismissed claims
that an accountant advising and guiding a client in making alleg-
edly fraudulent misrepresentations as insufficient. 179 It would not
dismiss the plaintiff's claim that the accounting firm committed se-
curities fraud by issuing a clean opinion however, because it found
that to be a statement made directly by defendant Arthur Ander-
sen.180 The court thus concluded that this was not affected by Cen-
tral Bank.' 8 '
More toward the bright line end of the continuum, the District
Court of Massachusetts commented in In Re Centennial Tech. Li-
tig. 1 82 that the United States Supreme Court (in Central Bank)
was "not willing to read into Section 10(b) a cause of action for con-
duct that did not amount to what the text of the statute prohib-
ited-fraudulent or manipulative conduct."' 83 The Massachusetts
District Court felt that Central Bank's goal was to "constrict the
ambit of private actions under Section 10(b) and to thereby reduce
174. See id.
175. See id at 433.
176. See id.
177. See generally In re MTC Elec. Technologies Sholders Litig., 898 F. Supp.
974, 985 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (discussing the two main tests). MTC seems to be the
first case where the names of the tests are discussed. It also states how "[alt first
blush, these cases seem to suggest two distinct approaches," but that "[u]pon closer
scrutiny, however, these different approaches start to blur." Id. at 986.
178. 862 F. Supp. 1371 (E.D. Penn. 1994).
179. See id. at 1378.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. 52 F. Supp. 2d 178 (D. Mass. 1999).
183. Id. at 185.
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the number of parties implicated by that statute."184 It went on to
say that "[o] nly those primary violators, i.e., those who make a ma-
terial misstatement or omission or commit a manipulative act, are
subject to private suit under Section 10(b)."18 5 The court ruled
that Price Waterhouse, the accounting firm involved in Kendall
Square, had reviewed and approved the quarterly financial state-
ments and the prospectuses, but this did not constitute the making
of a material misstatement. 8 6 The logic behind the finding was
that because Price Waterhouse did not actually engage in the re-
porting of the financial statements and prospectuses, but only re-
viewed and approved them, the statements are not attributable to
Price Waterhouse and it cannot therefore be found liable for mak-
ing a material misstatement. 8 7 Note, however, that this decision
is directly opposite to the similar Ninth Circuit case of In re
Software Toolworks, 18s which reached the opposite conclusion
under substantial participation. Plaintiffs in Software Toolworks
pointed to ZZZZ Best for support of their position of accountant/
auditor liability, but the court noted "[tlo the extent ZZZZ Best
provides such support, the court declines to follow that decision,
relying instead on the Supreme Court's emphatic conclusion in
Central Bank that 'Section 10(b) prohibits only the making of a
material misstatement...'"189
The Massachusetts District Court (which decided Kendall
Square) also noted that the law imposes a broader liability for af-
firmative misrepresentations, and that a company will be found li-
able under Rule 10b-5 for affirmatively misleading investors into
purchasing its stock by providing materially false or incomplete in-
formation.190 The court goes even further to note that a viable Sec-
tion 10(b) claim can be pled without alleging the existence of a
fiduciary relationship.191
184, In re Kendall Square Research Corp., 868 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D. Mass. 1994).
185. Id.
186. See id. See also note 1 in the decision, explaining how "structuring" of
transactions is different than making of material misstatements.
187. See id. at 28.
188. 38 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1994).
189. In re Kendall, 868 F. Supp. at 28 n.2.
190. See In re Fidelity/Micron Securities Litig., 964 F. Supp 539, 545 (D. Mass.
1997).
191. See id.
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The Tenth Circuit, which has adopted the bright line test, ob-
served clearly and succinctly:
Reading the language of § 10(b) and 10b-5 through the lens of
Central Bank of Denver, we conclude that in order for ac-
countants to "use or employ" a "deception" actionable under
the antifraud law, they must themselves make a false or mis-
leading statement (or omission) that they know or should
know will reach potential investors. In addition to being con-
sistent with the language of the statute, this rule, though far
from a bright line, provides more guidance to litigants than a
rule allowing liability to attach to an accountant or other
outside professional who provided "significant" or "substan-
tial" assistance to the representations of others. 192
D. The Better Test
Though the bright line test may be easier to administer, 193 its
lower accuracy could be harmful to the markets over time. The
very circuit which advances this test in McMahan & Co. v. Wher-
ehouse Entertainment, Inc.194 notes that "[slome statements, al-
though literally accurate, can become, through their context and
manner of presentation, devices which mislead investors. For that
reason, the disclosure required by the securities laws is measured
not by literal truth, but by the ability of the material to accurately
inform rather than mislead prospective buyers."195 The statement
captures the idea that the markets look to information at face
value, meaning that today's investors have an expectation of accu-
racy of the reports that get released in connection with public com-
panies. Perhaps because of the very success of the Securities
Exchange Acts and the SEC, there is somewhat of a presumption
of truth to information in our markets. And showing just how nar-
row that tolerable range of accurate information can be, the Fifth
192. Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 1996).
193. One must question how much easier these decisions are in consideration of
Anixter. Though subscribing to the bright line test, "It]his securities fraud case,
first filed in 1973, already has been the subject of four published opinions by this
court. Over the past four years it has been ordered dismissed, reinstated, re-
manded, and now, appealed once more." Id. at 1218. Twenty three years later it
was remanded yet again. Admittedly, most of the delay was not due to the decision
of primary liability.
194. 900 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1990).
195. Id. at 579.
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Circuit in Isquith v. Middle South Utilities, Inc. 196 noted that "em-
phasis and gloss can, in the right circumstances, create
liability."197
The courts applying the bright line test appear rather naive
regarding the communication of financial information dissemi-
nated to the stock market and its investors. While it may be true
that some financial statements may not directly state the name of
the firm that prepared or audited them, sophisticated investors
trading on the major exchanges expect that such reports have been
created in collaboration with an accounting firm. This should be
enough to at least bring in the Chiarella duty of having that com-
pany's firm issue a statement to the contrary if they have not as-
sisted in the preparation of reports that are communicated by
others.
Another key indicator to substantial participation is that sub-
sequent to Central Bank, Congress passed a law authorizing the
SEC to bring enforcement actions against those who "knowingly
provide substantial assistance to another person" in violation of
the federal securities laws.198 This legislation, the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act of 1995, is not available for a private
party who seeks redress. It seems incongruent to have the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 available to both the SEC and private
parties in an attempt to ensure efficient administration of the se-
curities markets, and to then deny private parties the same rights
under this act. Instead, courts should allow private parties redress
via the substantial participation test.
When all is said and done, the true issue becomes how one
defines the term "indirectly." Clearly, the concept of indirect ac-
tion was intended to create liability in some instances, as the term
is used in both Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Yet the other bound-
ary becomes the decision in Central Bank, claiming that "it is not
plausible to interpret the statutory silence [on aiding and abetting]
as tantamount to an implicit congressional intent to impose § 10(b)
aiding and abetting liability."199 Yet even Central Bank acknowl-
edges that while aiding and abetting may not be enough for liabil-
196. 847 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1988).
197. Id. at 203.
198. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(f) (1994).
199. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
185 (1994).
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ity, the "absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not
mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are always
free from liability under the securities Acts." 2°° As a conclusion on
this area of the decision, the Court in Central Bank notes that
"[any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank,
who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstate-
ment (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities re-
lies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5. ... "201
To resolve this issue, it is necessary to strike a balance be-
tween adequately protecting investors, yet stopping before giving
them scapegoats to sue every time they lose money. It seems an
odd strategy to allow one to shirk all liability by simply marking
exhibits as 'unaudited.' This is because the markets have an ex-
pectation that companies do an annual audit of financial state-
ments, but that interim statements are likely unaudited. Thus,
there is a connotation attached to usual procedures that even
though an audit may not have been conducted, the accounting firm
is still involved to some degree. This gives weight to the substan-
tial participation test. For example, in Wright, it is not contested
that the communications were not made directly from the audi-
tors.20 2 Instead, one of the complaints was that Ernst & Young, by
electing to perform only a limited review of the acquired Summit
business, "did not uncover the massive 'accounting and financial
reporting irregularities' at BT-Summit."20 3 Thus, it appears audi-
tors are expected to do more than issue some reports. This shows
how the markets are relying on more than direct communications
from these third parties.
VII. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the substantial participation test evolved because the
court deciding ZZZZ Best felt behavior that outrageous should not
be allowed to slip through the cracks. Regardless of whether the
court considered this, it is definitely something that should be
given thought. Trying to put a muzzle on the information expecta-
tions of market investors serves no fruitful purpose.
200. Id. at 191.
201. Id.
202. See Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998).
203. See id. at 172.
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If a case such as Wright were subjected to the substantial par-
ticipation test as opposed to its own bright line test, it is rather
unlikely to yield a different result.2° 4 The flip-side, however, is
where the danger lies. Subjecting ZZZZ Best to the bright line test
would likely not show any liability20 5.
If the purpose of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are to prevent
fraud, perhaps a hard line needs to be taken, saying that despite
an auditor's being duped by a rather elaborate hoax, such an outra-
geous scheme should not have gone undetected. Further, it is a
second atrocity where an auditor becomes aware of information
contrary to that which they have participated in preparing, review-
ing, etc., and they do not disseminate a correction to the market
that is relying on it. If this became a trend, our markets, respected
throughout the world for the integrity in information yielded,
would be no safer than that of many lesser developed nations.
Further, the Second Circuit fully appreciated the fact that
markets use and make assumptions about information that comes
from companies at the stage of a corporation's life where they are
about to become a public company. If it is too easy for an account-
ant, auditor, or other professional to walk away from statements
that, while technically might have been made by a third party,
would be attributed to the professional by reasonable investors, we
lose our corporate checks and balances.
To conclude, the substantial participation test is the best al-
ternative to promote the goals of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Us-
ing a lower threshold would soon have American stock markets
selling more than just securities short.
Russell P. Marsella
204. This is more than pure conjecture. In its opinion, the Second Circuit noted
that "even under the 'substantial participation' test, we would be hard pressed to
conclude that the amended complaint alleged an actionable misrepresentation
within the meaning of § 10(b)." Id. at 176.
205. In ZZZZ Best, the auditors were duped into signing off on the finances of
the company. However, even so, this would likely be viewed as aiding and abet-
ting, which doesn't rise to the threshold necessary for primary liability.
